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 Abstract 
Major issues and challenges encountered in modeling and analyzing agricultural and 
trade policy reforms are reviewed. We focus on the modeling approach and pay special 
attention to the type and scope of the models, the calibration of a realistic baseline 
scenario, the representation of the reform agreement, the use of extra-model information, 
the choice of metrics to measure reform impacts, and emerging issues in policy modeling. 
Existing solutions and unresolved issues are examined. We stress the complementarity of 
various modeling approaches in assessing policy reforms and the importance of helping 
users understand the limitations of the chosen approach. 
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Challenges in Modeling the Effects of Trade Agreements  
on the Agricultural Sector 
Trade agreements pose unique challenges to the policy analyst. Simple partial equi-
librium analysis may be adequate for estimating the directional impacts of a single 
change in tariffs or subsidies on trade, prices, production, and consumption. Trade 
agreements, however, typically result in a complex set of policy adjustments that have 
multiple, often contradictory impacts on commodity markets. Reforms frequently have 
important effects on non-agricultural sectors (e.g., energy, food processing, textiles, and 
apparel), with important feedback effects on agricultural markets. Competent analysts can 
disagree not just about the magnitude of likely agricultural market impacts but even about 
the direction. 
Consider estimating impacts of a hypothetical new World Trade Organization 
(WTO) agreement for U.S. agricultural commodity markets. The hypothetical agreement 
would limit permissible agricultural tariffs, export subsidies, and internal support meas-
ures and would also change WTO rules in other areas. In evaluating such an agreement, 
the analyst is required to make a series of important choices which will eventually dictate 
the modeling approach to be used.  
Some of the key choices and questions analysts must address are as follows: 
• Types and scope of models. No single model can fully capture all the possible 
impacts of a complex trade agreement. Analysts must balance the desire for a 
broad sectoral, commodity, policy, and country scope with the need for detailed 
coverage of particular markets and policies. 
• Reference scenario. A proper measure of the impact of a trade agreement is to 
compare results under a baseline, or “business-as-usual,” scenario without the 
agreement in place with results from a set of projections or simulations that in-
clude the policy reform scenarios. An agreement to reduce subsidies by 50 
percent relative to those during a reference period may have little impact on 
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commodity markets if current policies have already reduced projected subsidies 
by 60 percent. The reference scenario can reflect recent history or a baseline pro-
jection over some future time horizon.  
• Representation of the policy reform agreement. Even the most complex mod-
els fail to capture all the nuances of current policies, and agreements can be 
implemented in various ways. Bound tariffs are not the same as applied tariffs and 
policies are generally not as simple as modelers assume. Often the analysis is un-
dertaken before the modalities of the agreement are spelled out, and it can be 
difficult simply to find current data on policy parameters. Further, analysts and 
their models must recognize that governments typically try to find ways to im-
plement agreements that minimize harm to influential groups.  
• Extra-model information. No matter how good a model is, there are certain to 
be some important features of a trade agreement that are not captured fully or 
properly by the model. Problems may range from insufficient model detail to 
changes in agent behavior that may result under a new trade regime. Analysts 
must decide whether and how to introduce judgment and/or other extra-model in-
formation. 
• Metrics for measuring the impact of reforms. To indicate the impact of policy 
reforms, most modelers report impacts on market prices and quantities, trade 
flows, farm returns, and government budgets. These metrics address the concerns 
of some stakeholders, such as farm interests and policymakers. Also important to 
other stakeholders (consumers, environmental groups, non-governmental devel-
opment organizations, and various foreign stakeholders) are welfare measures of 
aggregate gains and of transfers among groups. 
• Emerging issues. It is well known that as tariff barriers decline, non-tariff meas-
ures (NTMs) become more important. Except for quantitative restrictions, 
relatively little attention has been given to quantification of NTMs in agricultural 
and food product trade. Since NTMs are prevalent in food and agricultural trade 
and more likely to restrain trade as tariffs decline, it is increasingly important to 
assess their impact on trade. Another issue is the incorporation of food markets 
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close to the consumer. Value is added from the farmgate to retail, and consumers 
face a variety of choices, which can change when borders open. 
The balance of our paper examines and reviews these major issues and challenges 
encountered in modeling and analyzing multilateral agricultural trade policy reforms. In 
the following sections, we focus on multimarket, partial-equilibrium models used for 
outlook projections and policy analysis, such as those used by the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the Food and Agricultural Policy 
Research Institute (FAPRI), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). Where 
relevant, points will be illustrated by discussing choices faced by analysts with FAPRI in 
conducting analysis of trade agreements and other policy changes. We review existing 
solutions and unresolved issues and stress the complementarity of various modeling 
approaches in assessing policy reforms.  
 
Types and Scope of Models 
Trade agreements affect many markets simultaneously. A new WTO agreement on 
agriculture, for example, could affect tariffs and subsidies for a wide range of agricultural 
products in many countries. On this basis, once could argue for a model that covers many 
countries and commodities and pays close attention to cross-commodity effects. Such a 
model would recognize that a limitation on subsidies reducing wheat production in one 
country may end up affecting not just wheat markets in that country and around the world 
but also markets for competing grains, animal products, and more.  
Trade agreements affect more than just agricultural markets. Reductions in manufac-
turing product tariffs and other features of agreements may have important effects on 
production, trade, and prices in other sectors of the economy. In the aggregate, these 
effects may be large enough to have significant impacts on employment, investment, and 
income levels in the general economy. Similarly, in countries where agriculture is a 
significant share of the total economy, changes in agricultural markets may have mean-
ingful impacts on non-agricultural sectors. Computable general equilibrium (CGE) 
models that explicitly account for interactions between agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors of the economy have an obvious advantage in assessing economywide trade 
agreements (Hertel 1997; Goldin and van der Mensbrugghe 1996). CGE models also 
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account for bilateral trade flows and so are better suited to capture the implications of 
regional trade agreements than are non-spatial models.  
Provisions of trade agreements often are phased in slowly, as governments seek to 
give market participants time to adjust to policy changes. Market participants change 
investment decisions in response to changed incentives. In many cases, it takes time for 
the full consequences of changes in investment to be reflected fully in the supply and 
demand for agricultural products (e.g., biological lags mean that it may take some time 
for changed incentives to be fully reflected in beef production levels). Also, trade agree-
ments often tie changes in subsidies or tariffs to levels prevailing during some base 
period. On the basis of these factors, once could argue for using dynamic models to 
assess the effects of trade agreements.  
Proper analysis of trade agreements would seem to require large-scale, dynamic, 
general equilibrium models. Indeed, some excellent analyses of trade agreements have 
been done with CGE models (Hertel 1997; The World Bank 2003). Such models are 
particularly valuable when agreements have major impacts on the non-agricultural sectors 
of the economy, or when agriculture is a large portion of the general economy (e.g., in 
many developing countries). Despite progress made with the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP) (Hertel 1997), major trade-offs remain. CGE models sacrifice commod-
ity and policy detail important in examining agricultural trade agreements and often lag 
on policy and market information.  
FAPRI and OECD have opted for multi-market, partial-equilibrium models that lack 
desirable general-equilibrium features but provide considerable and very current detail in 
representing markets and policies for selected countries and commodities. The lack of 
sectoral interactions in these models can be crudely remedied by incorporating exogenous 
information from CGE analysis, such as shifts in growth of gross domestic product 
induced by trade liberalization. 
Commodity and policy detail is especially important in evaluating the effects on 
world dairy markets of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA). The 
agreement places separate limits on allowable levels of subsidized exports of cheese, 
butter, skim milk powder, and “other dairy products.” These limits have had significant 
impacts on the European Union, the predominant user of export subsidies, but the im-
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pacts differ across the various dairy products. E.U. subsidized exports of cheese and other 
dairy products (mostly whole milk powder) regularly have been constrained by the 
URAA limits, but the cap on subsidized E.U. butter exports has never been binding. 
To estimate the impacts of the export subsidy limitation on E.U. (and world) dairy 
markets, it is useful to have a model that includes explicit representations of each of the 
product markets. The interrelationships among these markets must be properly captured. 
For example, cheese production can increase only if there is either an increase in milk 
production or a reallocation of milk fat and protein away from other dairy products. In the 
European Union, milk production is largely determined by marketing quotas, so alloca-
tion of milk components to various products is essentially a zero-sum game. To properly 
capture all the consequences of the URAA or a future trade agreement for dairy markets, 
the model must capture not only these technical and economic relationships but also the 
finer points of E.U. dairy policy, ranging from marketing quotas to intervention buying 
and consumption subsidies (Binfield et al. 2001). 
In the case of cheese, analysis is further complicated by product heterogeneity. The 
URAA export subsidy limit applies to total cheese exports, but the European Union exports 
a wide variety of cheeses, and export subsidies are only used for certain cheeses to certain 
destinations. It would in some ways be desirable to model each of the varieties of cheese 
separately, but this is impractical, both because the model would quickly become unman-
ageable and because the required data are simply unavailable. The heterogeneity of cheese 
and the lack of data force analysts to make a series of assumptions about the substitutability 
(in production or consumption) of various cheeses, normal relationships between prices, 
and so forth. These assumptions, in turn, largely drive estimates of the impacts on exports 
and prices of a given limitation on subsidized exports. 
 
Reference Scenario 
Sometimes analysts will argue that baselines are not important, because what mat-
ters (or at least, should matter) is the change from the baseline that results when an 
alternative scenario is implemented. While there may be times when this is true, the 
particular provisions of many trade agreements mean that baselines matter, and they 
often matter a lot. 
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The U.S.-E.U. joint proposal made prior to the failed meeting in Cancun provides 
prime examples of the importance of baselines. The proposal would have required reduc-
tions in amber box support, though the percentage reduction was unspecified. However, 
because such reductions would be relative to a capped level that is loosely tied to support 
levels from the 1980s, the actual reductions relative to a 2003 current policy baseline would 
very likely be small or even zero. Further, the joint proposal set a limit (5 percent of 
domestic production value) on spending in a redefined blue box that would include U.S. 
countercyclical payments and certain E.U. payments. Given a 2003 current policy baseline, 
it was unclear whether the proposed limitation was likely to ever prove binding on actual 
government support measures in the United States and European Union.  
Because the results of analysis are often baseline dependent, FAPRI devotes consid-
erable time and resources each year to the development of baselines that reflect current 
market and policy information. A preliminary baseline is prepared in November, re-
viewed at a December conference, and revised in January to incorporate reviewer 
comments and other new information. The baseline reflects current government policies 
in the United States and other countries and those that have been formally decided for the 
future. The January 2004 FAPRI baseline incorporates not only the 2002 U.S. Farm 
Security and Rural Investment Act and the 2003 E.U. reforms of the Common Agricul-
tural Policy but also the accession of 10 new member states to the European Union in 
May 2004. 
Having a baseline that reflects current information is critical if an analyst is asked for 
a best estimate of the impacts of a proposed trade agreement or other change in policy. 
While FAPRI prepares a baseline once a year, there are times when it would be desirable 
to update baselines even more frequently, as an out-of-date baseline can result in mislead-
ing analysis when macro-economic and market conditions evolve rapidly.  
A prime example of this is detailed by Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1999), who de-
scribe the political process that led to the 1996 farm bill. An important factor contributing 
to the political success of decoupled payments was a Congressional Budget Office 
baseline that appeared inconsistent with conventional wisdom in late 1995. The baseline, 
prepared before the 1995 run-up in grain prices, projected relatively high expenditures 
under a continuation of 1990 farm bill policies. As prices rose, it became clear that actual 
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expenditures under 1990 farm bill policies would be very small, at least in 1996. Guaran-
teed decoupled payments appeared to reduce government expenditures relative to the 
baseline prepared in early 1995, even though it was widely understood that payments 
under the program would actually exceed those that would have occurred under previous 
legislation, at least in the short run. Ironically, the late 1995 conventional wisdom also 
proved incorrect, as prices fell sharply in 1997, resulting in pressure to supplement the 
payments guaranteed under the 1996 farm legislation. 
Given the inherent uncertainty of agricultural markets and the baseline dependence 
of many analytical results, FAPRI has begun the process of shifting to a stochastic 
approach to policy analysis. For U.S. markets, a simplified version of the FAPRI model-
ing system is used to generate 500 alternative baselines that differ from one another in 
their assumptions about a variety of random supply and demand factors. Draws of these 
exogenous variables are made from correlated empirical distributions based on data from 
the last 20 years or so. The results generated allow one to examine a wide variety of 
possible outcomes for commodity markets and to examine the impacts of policy changes 
under different starting conditions.  
The importance of this approach is clear in the case of many U.S. farm programs 
that have asymmetrical effects. For example, consider the marketing loan program. If 
demand is strong, market prices may be well in excess of loan rates and producers may 
make production decisions with little reference to potential loan program benefits. On 
the other hand, if demand is particularly weak, prices may be well below loan rates and 
the resulting marketing loan expenditures may be large. At low market prices, the 
marketing loan program may have large impacts on producer planting decisions. 
Because marketing loan benefits cannot be negative, the mean results from 500 alter-
native futures are often significantly different from results generated under the single 
deterministic baseline. In three years of doing this type of analysis, FAPRI has found 
that, due to these asymmetric payment effects, average levels of government spending 
in the stochastic baseline are consistently larger than are levels of government spend-
ing in the deterministic baseline. 
Time and resource constraints have not allowed FAPRI to extend the stochastic ap-
proach to its models for other countries, so FAPRI has not conducted an assessment of a 
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multilateral trade agreement using stochastic analysis. Given asymmetries in government 
policies and interest in how alternative trade rules might play out under different market 
conditions, there are reasons to extend the use of stochastic methods. 
 
Representation of the Policy Reform Agreement 
The dairy example points out the importance of ensuring that the terms of a trade 
agreement being negotiated are properly reflected in the model. Only a very detailed 
model can explicitly incorporate both current policies and the combination of policy 
changes that is likely to result from a trade agreement. 
Market Access 
Tariff reductions illustrate the complex reality of current policies. The provisions of 
trade agreements make analysis much more complicated than in the textbook case. Often 
cited are the tariff overhang, the distinction between bound and applied tariffs, and 
“water in the tariff,” the redundant tariff problem (de Gorter, Ingco, and Ignacio 2004). 
One can cite numerous examples in which current bound tariffs are well above applied 
tariffs, so that even a large reduction in bound tariffs may have little or no impact on the 
tariffs actually paid by importers and, thus, little impact on commodity markets. In 
response to the URAA, countries showed great creativity during the tariffication process 
in selecting base periods, reference prices, transportation costs, and quality differentials.  
Similar pitfalls may take place with most-favored nation and preferential tariffs, when 
increasing quantities are being traded under preferential agreements. In spite of recent 
efforts, getting reliable, current data on applied tariffs remains difficult, as illustrated by the 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) database managed by the World Bank and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, so modelers are often tempted to 
treat bound and applied tariffs as if they were synonymous. Making such an assumption 
introduces a systematic and potentially large bias in quantitative analysis. Data on preferen-
tial tariffs are even less well covered in many databases. Having current information is also 
critical. The lagged information in the GTAP database, for example, often overstates 
protection because it does not reflect current WTO commitments; hence, policy simulations 
based on GTAP protection data will exaggerate resource allocation effects and welfare 
implications of multilateral tariff reforms.1 
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The difficulty in properly capturing the impacts of tariff reduction goes far beyond 
concerns about the distinction between applied and bound tariffs. A nontrivial issue is 
that supply, demand, and trade data are often reported in terms of aggregated commodi-
ties (e.g., cheese), rather than the products corresponding to multiple tariff lines in each 
country’s tariff code. Even where data are available, aggregation raises a host of prob-
lems on how to aggregate meaningfully the tariff lines. This problem pervades all 
modeling approaches to some degree. 
Tariff rate quotas (TRQs) likewise raise a variety of thorny issues, as reality is often 
much more complicated than are textbook examples. Even an underfilled TRQ may have 
important market impacts, depending on the reasons for the underfill. Where TRQs are 
binding, market prices in exporting and importing countries may be largely divorced 
from one another, making it difficult to determine a “normal” basis between prices in the 
two countries (de Gorter and Hranaiova 2004; Skully 2001).  
Finally, agreements like the URAA often do not prescribe in advance the precise 
levels of permissible tariffs on a commodity-by-commodity basis. The broad agreement 
may require an average rate of reduction across all tariff lines, as did the URAA, with 
commodity-specific reductions only spelled out in country schedules that are often 
unavailable when analysis must be done. Analysts, therefore, often must make their own 
assumptions about how a general tariff-reduction rule will actually be implemented. 
While it is convenient to assume that all tariff lines will be treated equally, it is generally 
safe to assume that countries will use whatever discretion they have to minimize harm to 
influential groups.  
A host of other areas are intentionally left vague, allowing for strategic choices by 
policymakers. For example, in reference to the Doha modalities, one can think of the set of 
special products developing countries can claim for food security, rural development, and 
livelihood security concerns. These products are given differential treatment. Further, 
different TRQ expansion rates can be assigned to different products, provided that a quarter 
of the TRQ with lower expansion rates is balanced with a similar number at a higher 
expansion rate. Finally, countries with export subsidy commitments can select which 
products will be phased out in the longer or shorter terms.  
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It is commonly accepted that the reality of tariff reduction under the URAA had far 
smaller market impacts than anticipated during the negotiations. Many analysts (e.g., 
Goldin and Knudsen 1990; Helmar, Meyers, and Hayes 1994) probably overestimated 
effects of the agreement’s market access provisions (Meilke, McClatchy, and de Gorter 
1996). Model shortcomings related to bound versus applied tariffs, heterogeneous prod-
ucts, and the like account for some of the overestimation, but much of it stemmed from a 
failure to capture the lengths to which countries would go to exploit provisions of the 
agreement to protect sensitive markets. Tariffication (the process of converting import 
quotas and other quantitative restrictions into TRQ equivalents) often resulted in little or 
no real additional access, as countries “creatively” used the new rules to set out-of-quota 
tariffs at such high levels that they remained prohibitive even after mandated reductions. 
TRQs themselves were often set at levels well below those assumed by modelers, who 
took the proclaimed targets (e.g., minimum access equal to no less than 5 percent of 
domestic consumption) too literally. 
Internal Support 
In spite of all the problems associated with modeling tariffs and other market access 
measures, the problems are probably much greater in the area of internal support meas-
ures. One could argue that the final URAA did little to reduce the total level of 
government support provided agricultural producers in the United States, European 
Union, and most other countries. In part, this was because the negotiators were clever in 
writing the final provisions in such a way that most policies in place in 1994 could have 
been retained indefinitely without running afoul of the agreement. Perhaps the most 
important effect of the internal support agreement was not to encourage countries to 
reduce overall levels of payments to producers and land owners but to move support from 
categories subject to limitation to categories not subject to limitation. 
Models without detailed representation of government price and income support 
policies are ill-equipped to examine the implications of an agreement like the URAA. For 
a given level of government support as measured by a producer support estimate or an 
aggregate measure of support, different policies may have very different implications for 
commodity supply.  
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Especially important are decisions about how to represent the impacts of payment 
programs that are fully or at least partially decoupled from production decisions. While 
most analysts would agree that a dollar spent on U.S. marketing loan benefits would have 
a different impact on production than a dollar spent on direct or countercyclical pay-
ments, there is little agreement on just what the impacts would be. If the United States 
were to respond to requirements of a new trade agreement by increasing less coupled 
support (e.g., direct payments) to offset reductions in more coupled support (e.g., market-
ing loan benefits), the estimated net effect on commodity supplies would obviously 
depend on how these policies are modeled. 
Finally, it should be noted that good estimates of the effects of policies on crop sup-
ply are only possible if models properly handle cross-commodity effects. In FAPRI’s 
U.S. crops model, the acreage devoted to any given crop is fairly sensitive to relative 
returns from the market and coupled payment programs. However, the total cropland 
devoted to production of the major field crops in aggregate is relatively inelastic with 
respect to returns. (In the current version of the model, the aggregate elasticity of major 
field crop area with respect to weighted-average net returns over variable production 
costs is 0.06.) As a result, even a fairly large change in coupled payments will have only 
a modest effect on overall crop area, although it may have a major impact on the mix of 
crops produced.  
 
Extra-Model Information 
By their nature, trade agreements often require significant changes in policies that fun-
damentally change the decisions faced by economic agents. As a result, model parameters 
estimated from time-series data often may have limited relevance. Even when the basic 
structure of agent decision making is not altered, major policy reforms can result in deci-
sion variables that take values far out of the range of the historical data. A variety of other 
factors may also make it unreasonable to expect time-series data to provide all the informa-
tion needed to build models appropriate for policy analysis (Just 2001). 
Practitioners of policy modeling know that models are in a constant state of repair. 
New out-of-sample data may suggest that old equations are inadequate, or a fundamental 
change in policy or structure may mean that underlying model assumptions no longer 
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hold. In some cases, a better model can be created through standard techniques—
respecifying and re-estimating equations, and so forth. 
Price expectations are important in modeling both supply and demand behavior. 
Models that assume naïve or adaptive expectations may perform adequately under most 
circumstances but may fail to capture the consequences of policy changes that alter agent 
expectations. In some cases, one possible response is to incorporate contemporaneous 
prices in supply response functions (e.g., Sumner and Wohlgenant 1985; Hertel 1997; 
Beghin et al. 2003). 
In many other cases there is simply no practical way to improve the model using 
standard statistical techniques. Data may be unavailable or unreliable, or the new situa-
tion may be so novel that available data are of little value. In addition, the reality is that 
important policy analysis must often be done quickly, before there is time to fully rework 
models so they are ideally suited to the question at hand. In these circumstances it is both 
necessary and desirable to incorporate as much extra-model information as possible. 
FAPRI places a lot of emphasis on collecting and incorporating extra-model infor-
mation whenever necessary and appropriate. The baseline review session each year is a 
formal means of identifying factors that may not be properly incorporated in the model. 
When time and resources permit, the information obtained is used to suggest changes in 
the model. Estimated equations may be re-estimated, and the parameters in synthetic 
equations may be altered. In other cases, the new information may simply be incorpo-
rated by means of calibration factors added to existing model equations. 
In all cases, the goal is to develop a set of projections that reflects the analyst’s best 
judgment about likely market outcomes under the stated set of assumptions. The model is 
used as a tool to ensure that results are consistent with biological and economic funda-
mentals, but essentially the estimates are those of the analysts, not of the model. As 
argued by Just, this approach is not only acceptable, but it is essential for those who wish 
to provide the best possible information about the likely impacts of policy change. 
 
Metrics for Measuring the Impact of Reforms 
Economists, by training, care about efficient allocation of resources or net social 
welfare. However, agricultural producers and policymakers may care less about net social 
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welfare than about the effects of policy changes on prices, production, trade, producer 
returns, and budgetary expenditures. Hence, transfers are often more informative than is 
the net efficiency impact. A recurrent observation is that consumers are often ignored in 
the analysis, although they may bear the brunt of farm and trade policy. When consumer 
interest is involved or when society at large cares about policy impacts, existing projec-
tion models can easily be extended using approximations of welfare effects with 
Marshallian surplus measures and transfers. The models can also be retrofitted on de-
mand to compute “exact” welfare measures using flexible approaches satisfying 
integrability2 (Beghin et al. 2003). 
The computation of the budgetary implications of policy reform has become more 
complex with the increasing presence of countercyclical policies that may or may not be 
effective depending on the state of the world. One can use stochastic analysis in the 
evaluation of policy options when such considerations are needed. For example, a deter-
ministic analysis may suggest that current U.S. policies would comply with WTO 
limitations on internal support measures (Hart and Babcock 2002), but stochastic analysis 
may reveal a significant probability that subsidy limits would be breached in the absence 
of policy changes (FAPRI 2002). In other words, the expected value of estimated impacts 
from stochastic analysis may be significant even when the estimated impact from deter-
ministic analysis is zero. For many issues, a deterministic analysis may give significantly 
different results than would a stochastic analysis that reflects the inherent uncertainties in 
world commodity markets.  
 
Emerging Issues 
Non-tariff Measures  
It is well known that as tariff barriers decline, NTMs become more important. Such 
measures can be broadly defined (Deardorff and Stern 1998) as measures that lead to a 
reduction in import quantity, increase prices of imported goods, change the elasticity of 
demand for imports, diminish price transmission, increase uncertainty, or by other means 
add non-market costs to transaction costs of traded goods. Some of these measures are as 
visible as quantity and price restrictions and sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, and 
some are as invisible as customs delays and corruption. These measures can be imposed 
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at the border or in domestic markets. NTMs include export as well as import restraints, 
though emphasis tends to be on the import restraint side. Some of these measures are 
disciplined by WTO and GATT agreements, some are allowed and not disciplined, and 
some are not allowed.  
Examples of NTMs include price controls (floor and ceiling prices, variable levies), 
quantitative controls (import licensing, quotas, import bans, export restrictions), state 
trading enterprises (sole importing and exporting agencies), technical trade barriers 
(standards, labeling, certification, testing), customs (classification and clearance), subsi-
dies (production and export), and intellectual property rights (protection level, 
discriminatory protection). 
To better assess the benefits of the trade liberalization in agriculture, we have to be 
able to assess how the reduction in NTMs will increase market access in agriculture. A 
recent analysis shows that for both developed and developing country exporters, 
“…agricultural products are the sector with the highest incidence of NTMs” (Bora, 
Kuwahara, and Laird 2002). Since NTMs are so prevalent in food and agricultural trade 
and more likely to restrain trade as tariffs decline, it is increasingly important to assess 
their impact on trade. Except for quantitative restrictions, relatively little attention has 
been given to quantification of NTMs in agricultural and food product trade. In the 
context of trade liberalization studies, NTMs would generally diminish the benefits of 
liberalization and it is important to know whether this diminution is large or small. It is 
important to attract more attention to this issue, to learn from the more extensive work 
that has been done (including in other product categories), and, hopefully, to stimulate 
innovations that will improve our analysis (Beghin and Bureau 2001).  
There are also new NTMs arising from opportunistic behavior in TRQ administration 
leading to trade impediments and quota underfill. It is difficult to capture in any model 
the impact of these various administrative mechanisms used by countries in implement-
ing the allocation of TRQs (Skully 2001). The dispute between the United States and the 
Philippines on pork is a classic example. 
Value-Added Products 
Partial equilibrium models tend to focus on agricultural raw materials; they overlook 
or ignore much of the value added beyond basic processing. The typical models include 
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oil and meal from processed oilseeds, meat from live animals, dairy products from milk, 
and raw sugar from sugar beets and cane. However, much value is added in further 
processing and then in retailing. The models do not reflect the true choice set for con-
sumers. Because the coverage of value-added products is wanting in these models, 
analysts are not able to capture the impacts of tariff escalation and proposals to reduce the 
escalation, as suggested in the Doha modalities. 
Britz and Schmidhuber (2002) provide a first attempt to incorporate retail margins 
into consumer prices in the FAPRI-type model used for the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization’s long-term projections. Their model exhibits higher consumer prices in 
industrialized countries to reflect the higher post-farmgate value added common in more 
advanced countries. However, the model treats the commodities in different countries as 
being homogeneous and connected to a single world market, although they embody 
heterogeneous value-added attributes across countries. 
Further, most projection models do not reflect the increase in the choice set brought 
by trade liberalization. When borders open, new products compete with domestic prod-
ucts. Trade liberalization brings gains in efficiency and increased product quality and 
diversity in protected domestic industries facing increased competition. For example, 
following NAFTA, Mexican consumers had a better choice of dairy products, and 
domestic brands dramatically improved their quality and expanded their line of products. 
As a result, Mexican consumers were better off and productivity in the Mexican dairy 
sector has increased substantially. Most models typically underestimate these gains from 
the expanded set and from the increased quality of domestic products, unless a Stiglitz-
Dixit-Spense structure is specified (Dixit and Norman 1980). This kind of consumer 
approach is ill-suited for FAPRI-type models that assume markets with homogenous 
commodities.3  
 
Concluding Comments 
Analysts face many challenges in modeling and analyzing agricultural and trade pol-
icy reforms. We focused on modeling approaches and paid special attention to the types 
and scope of models, the calibration of a realistic baseline scenario, the representation of 
the future reform agreement, extra-model information required for the analysis, the 
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choice of metrics to measure the impact of policy reform scenarios, and new issues facing 
policy modelers.  
Because of the many ambiguities regarding implementation of trade agreements, 
analysts are compelled to make certain assumptions about how countries will convert the 
terms of a trade agreement into actual policy changes. Any given interpretation is just one 
possibility in a continuum of possible cases. This uncertainty often leads analysts to 
examine limited cases such as full-liberalization scenarios. 
No single modeling approach dominates the others on all fronts, and some are better 
than others at specific tasks. The importance of complementary approaches cannot be 
overstated. CGE models have their own shortcomings but they force conceptual consis-
tency on a problem (Goldin and van der Mensbrugghe 1996) and provide useful 
information on spatial trade flows and factor prices important to agriculture (Hertel 
1997). They also capture feedback effects between processing sectors and agriculture that 
can be at best mimicked in partial equilibrium models. Muth-type multimarket models 
(Sumner and Wohlgenant 1985) provide useful insights because they include instant 
supply responses often lacking in large projection models; provide detailed welfare 
analysis, including transfers among agents; and are useful as learning devices to trace 
policy impacts on various agents and markets.  
Projection multimarket models such as OECD’s AGLINK model, the FAPRI model, 
and USDA’s commodity models have their own sets of strengths and weaknesses. 
Analysts using these models typically place a high premium on developing realistic 
baseline projections. Because estimates of the impacts of trade agreements and other 
policy changes are often very baseline dependent, it can be critical to have a baseline 
consistent with the latest available information on markets and policies. These models 
often carry more detail on particular policies and how they impact agent behavior than is 
found in other models. On the other hand, these models are often weak in terms of 
dynamics, price expectations, and linkages to the rest of the economy. 
In policy analysis, ignorance is not bliss! This is seemingly pedestrian but important 
and relevant to the policy analyst. Even the best models are dangerous tools in inexperi-
enced hands. Often a novice modeler does not perceive the limitations of the chosen tool 
and approach and just “cranks” the model without understanding the forces at work or 
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even the economics implied by model specification. This is true for all approaches. The 
more ready-to-use the modeling tool, the more dangerous the novice analyst tends to be. 
We would argue that the largest models such as GTAP are more exposed to this risk 
because of the user-friendliness and the large coverage of products and countries. Credi-
ble policy analysis relies on a combination of market intelligence, specialized knowledge, 
and modeling expertise. 
  
Endnotes 
1. The GTAP 5 database relies on 1997 and older data. The forthcoming GTAP 6 relies 
on 2000 and older data but it is still being debugged. However, comparing the newer 
and older data suggests that protection has been overstated by GTAP 5.  
2. Integrability refers to the existence of well-defined preferences underlying a system 
of consumer demand that allow recovery of a well-behaved expenditure function ra-
tionalizing the consumer demands and leading to a consistent utility function. 
Integrability implies that Hicksian demands have a symmetric, negative, semi-definite 
substitution matrix.  
3.  The increased efficiency could be mimicked by incorporating exogenous changes in 
productivity resulting from the policy shock, but this is a fix rather than an elegant 
solution. 
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